1 Selected by the purchaser, of course. Co., 407 Pa. 359, 180 A.2d 227 (1962) ; Hambelton v. Seldon, 163 Pa. Super. 259, 60 A.2d 369 (1948) .
3 E.g., Stagg v. Lawton, 133 Conn. 203, 49 A.2d 599 (1946) ; Kaercher v. Schee, 189 Minn. 272, 249 N.W. 180 (1933) 51, 161 A.2d 725 (1960) .
5 See Mulhall v. Bradley & Currier Co., 50 App. Div. 179, 63 N.Y. Supp. 782 (1900) ; Darling v. Moscowitz, 159 N.Y. Supp. 672 (Sup. Ct 1916) . For discussion of whether an action in quantum meruit should lie when a state statute requiring that the agreement to pay commissions be in writing prevents the broker from recovering on an oral contract of employment, see 46 Ky. L. J. 278 (1958) .
6 Conversations with a Philadelphia real estate broker in August and September, 1965, indicated that suit on the contract is the more desirable alternative. The amount (380) therefore be a suit on his employment contract for damages measured by the lost commission. To rebut defendant's contention that a commission cannot be recovered from one who never promised to pay it, the broker usually argues that the principal promised, as part of the employment contract, to buy a satisfactory parcel, or to sell to a satisfactory buyer.
7
The broker further claims that by arbitrarily refusing to buy or sell, the principal breached his contract and is liable for damages.
8
Since this promise to buy or sell is rarely expressly made, courts are frequently asked to imply it.
In Duross Co. v. Evans," a broker was hired by prospective purchasers to locate a suitable parcel of land within a certain area. Defendant purchasers selected one parcel from all those found by the broker and authorized him to submit a specific offer to the owner. The owner accepted the offer, agreed to pay the broker a commission when title passed and signed a contract of sale. Defendants then arbitrarily refused to sign this contract. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, held that the broker's complaint stated a cause of action on the brokerage contract saying: "Implicit in the allegations . . . is the agreement on the part of defendants to purchase on the basis of the alleged offer." 10 Unfortunately, this conclusion was not supported by analysis of what the parties reasonably expected. Moreover, the four major cases upon which the court relied are distinguishable since they involved express promises to buy or lease.
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of the quantum meruit recovery would probably not be equal to the lost commission since the commission is set with a view toward compensating the broker for his unsuccessful as well as his successful efforts.
7 The difficult question of what constitutes a satisfactory parcel or buyer is beyond the scope of this comment. See, e.g., Abbott v. Lee, 86 Conn. 392, 85 At. 526 (1912) ; Connell v. Avon Garage Co., 391 Pa. 189, 137 A.2d 765 (1958) ; Restifo v. Pastor, 129 A.2d 533 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1957) ; Dowining v. H. G. Smithy Co., 125 A.2d 272 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1956 ). In the cases discussed, the question whether the broker has performed to the satisfaction of defendant has not been in issue.
8 See cases cited note 3 supra; cases cited note 12 infra. 922 App. Div. 2d 573, 257 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1965 'd, 269 App. Div. 1025 , 59 N.Y.S.2d 375, aff'd, 296 N.Y. 597, 68 N.E.2d 881 (1946 , the Duross court cited only the supreme court decision. In the court of appeals, however, the allegations in the complaint were fully set out 296 N.Y. at 597. They clearly show an express promise to lease the premises that the broker found for the defendant. In Pease & Elliman, Inc. v. Gladwin Realty Co., 216 App. Div. 421, 215 N.Y. Supp. 346 (1926) , defendant wrote a letter to plaintiff which said: "I am to enter into a lease for 21 years . . . on the property located at 6 East Fortyeighth street, and will pay a net annual rental as follows. . . ." Id. at 422, 215 N.Y. Supp. at 347. Express promises were also present in McKnight v. McGuire, 117 Misc. 306, 307, 191 N.Y. Supp. 323 (Sup. Ct. 1921) , and in James v. Home of Sons & Daughters of Israel, 153 N.Y. Supp. 169 (Sup. Ct. 1915) . Not only do these four cases involve express promises to buy or lease, but all are concerned with a purchaser who hired his broker to obtain the sale or rental of an already selected property at a specific price. It is on the latter ground that the dissent in Duross distinguishes Duross is not the first case in which a court, without stating its reasoning, implied such a promise into a broker-principal employment con- 14 the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the lower court's flat refusal to read any promise to buy into the contract between broker and purchaser, 15 saying only: "The affidavits justify the inference that, in exchange for these services, defendants would, if plaintiff found lands satisfactory to them, complete and perform an agreement of sale with the vendor so that plaintiff might earn a commission from the vendor." 16
In other areas of contract law, when courts are asked to imply a promise, the test customarily used is whether a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would expect the promisor to perform the act which the promise requires.' 7 This test has been distilled from the cases by Professor Williston.1 8 When applied to the real estate commission problem, it focuses on whether a broker is reasonable in expecting that his principal will consummate a transaction once the broker has found a satisfactory parcel or buyer. By the time such a parcel or buyer has been found, the broker has practically completed his work. All that remains is to draw up the contract of sale and pass title, both of which functions are probably performed by lawyers. It hardly seems likely that a broker would spend valuable time seeking out prospects if he did not expect that a sale would be consummated once the principal approved the product of the broker's labor. Div. 2d 880, 193 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1959) (implied promise by buyer of motion picture rights to plaintiff's literary property either to make a film or to use reasonable efforts to do so).
The use of the reasonableness concept in the Williston test, however, might arguably require courts to examine the broker's reasonable prediction of his principal's thoughts. Although there is little doubt that these thoughts include the eventual consummation of a sale, the mystique of the written word might nevertheless lead a principal to believe that he is under no legal obligation to anyone until a written contract of sale is signed. Thus, the broker's expectation of a sale might be considered unreasonable if formed before that signing. But even though the principal is correct in assuming that he is under no obligation to the prospect until the contract of sale is signed, 20 he is not correct in thinking that this Statute of Frauds immunity extends to the implied promise in a broker's contract. The Statute, which protects the principal in his dealings with a prospect, does not affect the brokerage contract. 21 The principal may believe that the signing of the contract of sale alone triggers not only his obligation to the prospect but also his obligation under the brokerage agreement. Absent actual knowledge to the contrary, however, it is reasonable for the broker to expect that his principal is not relying on this erroneous assumption of law. The harshness of thus binding the principal is largely mitigated since he is never forced to purchase or convey as he might be in a successful suit upon the contract of sale; he is required only to pay damages to the broker in the amount of lost commissions.
Both the limited use of the ready, willing and able analysis in those cases in which the principal promises to pay commissions, and the courts' failure to use any analysis in the implied promise cases result from the under the Williston test, the purchaser should not be held liable for a failure to buy any of the parcels found unless he has approved them. However, once the purchaser has singled out one specific parcel and has authorized the broker to make one specific offer to the owner, the broker can certainly expect a sale if the offer is accepted.
20 This is so because the Statute of Frauds requires that executory promises to convey or purchase real estate be evidenced by a written memorandum signed by both parties. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 396 (1950) Ciraldo, 33 N.J. 51, 67, 161 A.2d 725, 734 (1960) .
Williston declares the Statute inapplicable to cases in which one party agrees with another to buy land from a third person, and the purchaser intends to hold it for his own benefit 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 488, at 514 (3d ed. 1960 ANN. § 25:1-9 (1940) . These statutes, however, do not apply to the promise to buy or sell that will be the basis of broker's action.
courts' apparent failure to realize that the ready, willing and able theory is in fact a specialized application of the Williston test. Use of the ready, willing and able theory as a mere mechanical formula to decide when a commission is earned, rather than as a means to determine when the principal's implied promise becomes a binding obligation, gives rise to the notion that in cases where the principal promises to pay commissions this express promise to pay is the crucial factor in the broker's recovery. This is a false notion. When real estate is sold, brokers' commissions are often paid by owners out of the money the owners receive from purchasers. 22 But when a sale is aborted because of the owner's fault, he must pay the commission directly out of his own pocket. To call this an earned commission is in no way responsive to the original intentions of either owner or broker. The parties contemplated not that a commission would be payable when a ready, willing and able purchaser was found, but rather that it would be payable only when that purchaser actually bought the property. Yet, when courts ignore the clear thrust of statements in owner-broker contracts that commissions will be paid only upon consummation of sale, 2 3 they seem to be declaring, as a matter of law, that the parties intended otherwise. Perhaps, however, these courts are merely guilty of a failure to elucidate the real foundation of their decisions-the implied promise to sell.
A more accurate description of what happens when the owner hires the broker and also agrees to pay the commission is that the owner makes two conditional promises to his broker. The first is an implied promise to sell his property to a purchaser who is ready, willing and able to buy on the owner's terms. This obligation to sell becomes absolute only if and when the broker finds such a purchaser. The second promise is the express promise to pay commissions, which becomes absolute when title passes. On a time continuum, the contract of employment has three phases. In the first period-between the initial employment and the finding of a ready, willing and able purchaser-both promises remain conditional. The owner is therefore free to terminate the relationship without liability. In the second period-between the finding of a purchaser and the passing Pa. 421, 198 AtI. 36 (1938) (commission to be paid only on final settlement and when full purchase money received). In these cases the courts felt that the contractual language precluded use of the ready, willing and able purchaser theory.
24 Cases in which the broker is given an exclusive right to sell are exceptions. Here the owner makes a third promise, absolute between the initial employment and the end of the time period in the listing agreement, in which he agrees not to take his house off the market, sell the property himself, or sell through another broker. See HEBARD & MEISE-L, PRINCIPLES OF REAL ESTATE LAW 392-93 (1964) . of title-the promise to sell has been rendered absolute, while the promise to pay commissions remains conditional. During the last time periodbetween the passing of title and the paying of commissions-the promise to sell has been fulfilled and the promise to pay is now absolute. Therefore, if the owner defaults during the second time period, the broker has only one absolute promise upon which to sue, the implied promise to sell.
25
Since the promise to pay is still conditional, the commission is not yet earned.
The failure of courts to discuss the ready, willing and able theory correctly in terms of an implied promise has left them unable to deal with those cases in which the defendant did not promise to pay commissions. In such a case, only the ready, willing and able version of the Williston test supplies satisfactory logic for reaching a proper result. Since the principal's default occurs during the time period when the promise to buy or sell is absolute, the broker can recover no matter who has promised to pay commissions.
2 5 Basing the broker's recovery upon an implied promise to sell rather than upon the express promise to pay might result in the prospect's attempting to recover damages or even force a sale by suing on this same implied promise as a third party beneficiary when the principal refuses to sign the contract of sale. There is little chance however that the prospect would succeed. Either the court could strike down the complaint on a Statute of Frauds theory, since the Statute does affect any promise to sell vis-i-vis vendor and purchaser, or it could simply declare that the prospect is a mere incidental beneficiary and thus not entitled to recover.
